Academic philosopher on snacking and moderation
Posted: Wed Jul 01, 2009 7:33 pm
Hi all,
My first post here, though I've been lurking (and no-s-ing) for about two months. It's going well, by the way- I'm a 5'11" man, down 16 pounds from 263 to 247. I've been lifting weights fairly seriously during that time, so that weight loss may include a few pounds of added muscle.
I'm an academic librarian and former bookseller (hence my screen name), and came across the following discussion of "satisficing." Satisficing, according to Wikipedia, is a concept used in economics and choice theory, meaning "a decision-making strategy that attempts to meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an optimal solution." In other words, sometimes "good enough" is fine. The following excerpt is long, and I'm not sure I buy his argument, but given his use of snacking as an example, I thought it might be of interest to some.
From: Beyond optimizing By Michael A. Slote (Harvard University Press, 1989, pg. 10-11).
Imagine that it is midafternoon; you had a good lunch, and you are not now hungry; neither, on the other hand, are you sated. You would enjoy a candy bar or Coca-Cola, if you had one, and there is in fact, right next to your desk, a refrigerator stocked with such snacks and provided gratis by the company for which you work. Realizing this, do you, then, necessarily take and consume a snack? If you do not, is that necessarily because you are afraid to spoil your dinner, because you are on a diet, or because you are too busy? I think not. You may simply not feel the need for any such snack. You turn down a good thing, a sure enjoyment, because you are perfectly satisfied as you are. Most of us are often in situations of this sort, and many of us would often do the same thing. We are not boundless optimizers or maximizers, but are sometimes (more) modest in our desires or needs. But such modesty, such moderation, is arguably neither irrational nor unreasonable on our part.
Of course, moderation has been exalted as a prime virtue in many religious and philosophical traditions. But when, for example, the Epicurians emphasized the rationality of moderation in the pursuit of pleasure, they recommended modesty in one’s desires only as a means to an overall more pleasurable, or less unpleasant, life, and in the example mentioned above, moderation is not functioning as a means to greater overall satisfaction or pleasures. One is not worried about ruining one’s figure or spoiling one’s dinner, and the moderation exemplified is thus quite different from the instrumental virtue recommended by the Epicurians. The sort of moderation I am talking about then, is not for the sake of anything else.
But then isn’t the moderate individual who is content with less a kind of ascetic? Not necessarily. An ascetic is someone who, with certain limits, minimizes his enjoyments or satisfactions; he deliberately leaves himself with less, unsatisfied. The moderate individual, on the other hand, is someone content with (what he considers) a reasonable amount of enjoyment; he wants to be satisfied and up to a certain point he wants more enjoyments rather than fewer, to be better off, rather than worse off; but there is a point beyond which he has no desire, and even refuses, to go. There is a space between asceticism and the attempt to maximize pleasure or enjoyment- do the best one can for oneself- a space occupied by the habit of moderation. And because such moderation is not a form of asceticism, it is difficult to see why it must count as irrational from the standpoint of egoistic or extra-moral individual rationality.
My first post here, though I've been lurking (and no-s-ing) for about two months. It's going well, by the way- I'm a 5'11" man, down 16 pounds from 263 to 247. I've been lifting weights fairly seriously during that time, so that weight loss may include a few pounds of added muscle.
I'm an academic librarian and former bookseller (hence my screen name), and came across the following discussion of "satisficing." Satisficing, according to Wikipedia, is a concept used in economics and choice theory, meaning "a decision-making strategy that attempts to meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an optimal solution." In other words, sometimes "good enough" is fine. The following excerpt is long, and I'm not sure I buy his argument, but given his use of snacking as an example, I thought it might be of interest to some.
From: Beyond optimizing By Michael A. Slote (Harvard University Press, 1989, pg. 10-11).
Imagine that it is midafternoon; you had a good lunch, and you are not now hungry; neither, on the other hand, are you sated. You would enjoy a candy bar or Coca-Cola, if you had one, and there is in fact, right next to your desk, a refrigerator stocked with such snacks and provided gratis by the company for which you work. Realizing this, do you, then, necessarily take and consume a snack? If you do not, is that necessarily because you are afraid to spoil your dinner, because you are on a diet, or because you are too busy? I think not. You may simply not feel the need for any such snack. You turn down a good thing, a sure enjoyment, because you are perfectly satisfied as you are. Most of us are often in situations of this sort, and many of us would often do the same thing. We are not boundless optimizers or maximizers, but are sometimes (more) modest in our desires or needs. But such modesty, such moderation, is arguably neither irrational nor unreasonable on our part.
Of course, moderation has been exalted as a prime virtue in many religious and philosophical traditions. But when, for example, the Epicurians emphasized the rationality of moderation in the pursuit of pleasure, they recommended modesty in one’s desires only as a means to an overall more pleasurable, or less unpleasant, life, and in the example mentioned above, moderation is not functioning as a means to greater overall satisfaction or pleasures. One is not worried about ruining one’s figure or spoiling one’s dinner, and the moderation exemplified is thus quite different from the instrumental virtue recommended by the Epicurians. The sort of moderation I am talking about then, is not for the sake of anything else.
But then isn’t the moderate individual who is content with less a kind of ascetic? Not necessarily. An ascetic is someone who, with certain limits, minimizes his enjoyments or satisfactions; he deliberately leaves himself with less, unsatisfied. The moderate individual, on the other hand, is someone content with (what he considers) a reasonable amount of enjoyment; he wants to be satisfied and up to a certain point he wants more enjoyments rather than fewer, to be better off, rather than worse off; but there is a point beyond which he has no desire, and even refuses, to go. There is a space between asceticism and the attempt to maximize pleasure or enjoyment- do the best one can for oneself- a space occupied by the habit of moderation. And because such moderation is not a form of asceticism, it is difficult to see why it must count as irrational from the standpoint of egoistic or extra-moral individual rationality.